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Abstract
Evolutionary economics provides a self-organizing stabilizing mecha-
nism without relying on mechanic equilibria. However, there are sub-
stantial differences between the genetic evolutionary biology, and the evo-
lution of institutions, firms, routines or strategies in economics. Most
importantly, there is no genetic codification and no sexual reproduction
in economic evolution, and the involved agents can interfere consciously
and purposefully. This entails a general lack of fixation and perhaps the
quick loss of information through a Muller’s ratchet like mechanism. The
present contribution discusses the analogy of evolution in biology and eco-
nomics and considers potential problems resulting in evolutionary models
in economics.
1 Introduction
From Thorstein Veblen to Alfred Marshall to Joseph Schumpeter and others,
economists have called for dynamic theories in economics that would be able to
consider evolutionary approaches. While many of the analytical tools were not
available at the time, both evolutionary biology and a slowly developing field
of evolutionary and dynamic economics (Nelson and Winter (1982), Hayden
(1982), Bush (1987), Silverberg et al. (1988), Elsner (2012), Gra¨bner (2015))
have made tremendous progress.
Providing a mechanism of stabilization without having to assume mechanic
equilibria, evolutionary dynamic approaches provide a very powerful modeling
tool. Being able to function with very few additional assumptions, they model
economic entities like institutions or firms illustratively and represent processes
of competition realistically as a selection device.
Yet there are both differences to evolutionary systems in biology and lessons
to be learned from evolutionary biology, particularly in relation to the retention
of information and the possible danger of its successive loss and catastrophic
destruction of the population.
The paper will proceed to discuss the history of economic thought on evolu-
tionary approaches in the following section before reviewing recent advances on
evolutionary loss of information in evolutionary biology and considering their
application to economics.
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2 Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Sci-
ence?!
In 1898, Thorstein Veblen (1898) contemplated that economics was not an evo-
lutionary science - in stark contrast to other political and social sciences. His
famous phrase had a double meaning: economics was neither open to change as
a system of theories nor was it willing to consider evolutionary processes as part
of its theories. Even with insights about more complex views of human society,
development and decision making ripening in anthropology, psychology, and so-
ciology, Veblen could find but a very static conception of actors in economics,
”passive and substantially inert and immutably given” (Veblen (1898)).1
The following century saw considerable advances not only in anthropology,
psychology, and sociology, on which economics could draw, but also in many sub-
disciplines of economics. Original institutional economics emphasized the role of
human instincts in shaping social and economic structure (Veblen (1899)), the
possibility of self reinforcing mechanisms in the form or Gunnar Myrdal’s cir-
cular cumulative causation (Myrdal (1957), Berger and Elsner (2007)), and the
interaction between socio-economic systems and their environment (Georgescu-
Roegen (1975)), to name a few among many other dynamic and evolutionary
aspects discussed in this community. Drawing on some of this research, Schum-
peterian evolutionary economics, starting with Richard Nelson and Sidney Win-
ter’s contribution (Nelson and Winter (1974, 1982)) introduced formal models
with extensive analogies from evolutionary biology. A very active and diverse
tradition has emerged from this line of research.Safarzyn´ska and van den Bergh
(2010) At the same time, Post-Keynesian, Kaldorian traditions (Kaldor (1940),
Goodwin (1967)) have added further examples of dynamic economic models that
defy the traditional quest for static systems and static equilibrium metaphors.
It has further been shown that such economic models can, without great dif-
ficulty, be developed into systems with strange attractors (chaotic dynamics)
(Lorenz (1987), Keen (1995)) thus begging the question how we are able to
make reasonable analyses and predictions about the past, present, and future
of real economic systems at all. How do those systems gain the (admittedly not
abundant) stability they have? - A question that will be taken up again below.
Despite the emergence of evolutionary approaches to economics and social
sciences and in spite of very promising results (Nelson and Winter (1982),
Silverberg et al. (1988), Safarzyn´ska and van den Bergh (2010)) achieved in
recent years, economics must still be considered a non-evolutionary science.
Economics textbooks show mostly convergence towards a canon of equilibrium
models (Elsner (2013)), the bulk of the profession continues to follow a set of
established theories and methods that have extensively been developed with
incredible amounts of research effort by incredible numbers of scholars over the
years. This has certainly not been without results - in the absence of crises
and crashes, the profession’s forecasting methods work exemplary, though this
is not much reconciliation when faced with the dragon king event they failed to
predict. With more effort in both pluralism of theories and theories that explic-
itly consider evolutionary and dynamic approaches, this might in the future be
1In contrast to other contemporary social scientists Veblen did notably not call for Dar-
winian approaches in economics or social sciences. For an overview, see Geoffrey M. Hodgson
(2005)
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alleviated.
Why should economic theories take evolutionary approaches into account?
Beyond what Veblen outlined almost 120 years ago, evolutionary models have
considerable advantages over equilibrium models. They provide a mechanism of
self-organization and self-stabilization of dynamic systems that is both credible
and illustrative. A force of selection driven by current environmental conditions
works on a diversity of routines or businesses or strategies which in turn is
maintained by either creative decision-making or random trial and error. The
current level of adaptation to the environment generically limits the extent
of successful economic activity. Environmental conditions themselves may, of
course, also be subject to change.
Scholars have warned about the danger of drawing unwarranted analogies
to evolutionary biology (Witt (2005), Hodgson (2001)): There are no obvious
analogies to a genotype-phenotype distinction in economic systems. Diversity
generation likely works in a completely different way as contrary to genetic
evolution, conscious actors are able to purposefully steer and influence their
businesses and strategies, their routines and technologies (Witt (2005)). Eco-
nomic entities, businesses, or routines, do not normally undergo reproduction.
Even the analogy of the evolutionary vehicle may be questionable; how much
resembles a routine or business an organism in their evolutionary function.
What remains is a system capable - under most conditions for most of the
time - of self-organization and self-stabilization. And yet, viewed from an in-
formation theoretic perspectives, biological and socio-economic evolution may
not be so different at all, as long as the analogies of the evolutionary vehicle
and of selection pressure are maintained. The evolutionary vehicle is charac-
terized by a distinct set of information - genetic or otherwise - that drives its
dynamic success. And this success depends as much on the quality of that
information as on the entity’s ability to reproduce or retain it intactly - save
for a warranted amount of diversity necessary for the functioning of the sys-
tem. It does not matter whether the information is transferred to increasing
numbers of child entities, whether it is maintained in a business experiencing
massive growth, whether it is coded in a formal alphabet or whether it exists in
a diffuse institutional arrangement or behavioral patterns. In fact, in the case
of tacit knowledge, it may even be possible that economic firms are unable to
codify or modify some of their crucial evolutionary information, in which case
the biological genotype-phenotype analogy may still be instructive.
Beyond the abstract information theoretic nature of the process, the similar-
ities between these different possible evolutionary models are quickly exhausted.
Maintenance of the integrity of an information set and its sexual and asexual
reproduction are profoundly different. Consequently the evolutionary model
chosen to model certain aspects of society or economics will have consequences
for the nature of the evolution possible in that model and for the results gener-
ated by it. A brief look at properties of evolutionary systems is hence warranted.
3
3 The Evolution of Nature and the Nature of
Evolution
Genetic evolution relies on a distinction between the actual genetic code - mostly
stored and expressed in long chains of nucleotides arranged as a stable (and in
case of DNA redundant, double) molecule around histone proteins - and the
organism that is generated from it. This genotype-phenotype separation does
not only remove the genetic code from the direct influence of the organism
but lends considerable stability to it. Genetic coding relies on just four distinct
nucleotides (though partly different for DNA and RNA), essentially a four letter
alphabet, which means that information is spread out across a considerable
number of letters, thus further reducing the danger of random errors. Most
information in most organisms is present as DNA chains, while the less stable
and redundant RNA is used for other purposes. Many organisms are further
diploid, i.e. every DNA chromosome is present twice, ensuring the presence of a
functional copy even in the event of a deleterious mutation. Reproduction may
or may not include recombination (sexual or asexual reproduction) which would
add further stability (Higgs (1994)).2
The genetic code is subject to evolutionary changes, diversity is generated
by way of mutations on which selection can act benefiting those varieties the
phenotype of which is better adapted to the current environmental conditions.
The evolutionary process would fail if either - diversity generation or selection
- would not work.
1. Missing selection pressure would lead to an explosion of population size
and variety, and thus to speciation, the development and separation of
new species.
2. Excessive selection pressure - hostile or rapidly and persistently changing
environmental conditions would lead to the destruction of all varieties of
the population.
3. Insufficient diversity generation compared to selection pressure would lead
to the existence of but one dominant trait and likely poor resilience to-
wards sudden environmental changes.
4. Excessive mutation, particularly in small non-recombining populations,
would lead to the accumulation of deleterious mutations and the loss of
the non-mutated master sequence as a result of random fluctuations, fol-
lowed by the loss also of the least-mutated sequences, etc., leading to
- in Hermann Joseph Muller’s words - ”a ratchet mechanism” (Muller
(1964)) that periodically irrevocably cuts away the fittest part of the popu-
lation (Muller’s ratchet). The phenomenon was termed error catastrophe.
(Eigen et al. (1988))
Biological populations exist in groups of traits that are distinguished only
by a few mutations with back and forth mutations occurring regularly thus
generating a steady population flow between the traits. These groups are termed
2Note that recent evidence points to a variety of other elements that also play a role in
genetic evolution, including, most importantly protein folding in histones around which DNA
is arranged (for an overview, see Campos et al. (2014)) but also, for instance prions.
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quasi-species as they do not share a common genome in the strict sense but do
nevertheless genetically evolve together. A mutation rate that is fairly high
but does not transgress the threshold to error catastrophe may add significant
resilience to a quasispecies in that it becomes much more capable of dealing
with changing environmental conditions. The error threshold depends positively
(of the order O n
√
0 < const. < 1) on the length of the genome; the strategy
is thus particularly feasible for entities with particularly short genomes; the
objective of achieving a high mutation rate would further make RNA-based, non-
recombining reproduction desirable. One particularly well-studied example are
RNA viruses (Eigen et al. (1988), Escarmı´s et al. (2006), Domingo (2006)) such
as HIV, poliovirus, hepatitis C virus; particularly with HIV, one difficulty is tat
the virus generates resistances faster that drugs can be developed and deployed.
A promising treatment relies on artificially putting the virus population into
error catastrophe mode (Mullins and Jensen (2006)).
Evolutionary systems in economics lack most of the stabilizing features
present in genetic evolution (coding not limited to four letter alphabet, thus
fewer redundancy, no diploidy, and arguably neither recombining reproduction
nor genotype-phenotype separation, hence the possibility of conscious inter-
ference with the evolutionary material). It would therefore be appropriate to
consider the role of phenomena known from high-mutation-rate systems in evo-
lutionary biology in evolutionary systems in economics. Both excessive rigidity
(insufficient mutation) and evolutionary loss of information in error catastrophe
like processes may be genuine concerns. In parts, economics could rely on meth-
ods developed in mathematical biology, the threshold to error catastrophe can
be determined fairly accurately and given sufficient information about existing
traits and mutation rates between them, stable quasispecies distributions could
be determined.
4 Cultural, Social, Economic Evolution
While the application of evolutionary or even Darwinian concepts to economics
or society is not new (cf. Hodgson (2001)), the influential modern theory of
cultural evolution is due to Richard Dawkins (1976): Ideas (”memes”) serve
as equivalent for genes in the cultural sphere, being exchanged between people
whose behavior under the influence of those ideas is then the cultural equivalent
of the phenotype.
Evolutionary economic models typically work along the same lines, consid-
ering routines, strategies, or technologies (Nelson and Winter (1982), Silver-
berg et al. (1988), Safarzyn´ska and van den Bergh (2010)) as gene equivalent,
on which evolutionary selection operates. The phenotype, the determinant of
evolutionary success, would be the firm itself, potentially including its profits,
shareholder value, or public image. As with Dawkinsian cultural evolution, re-
production may include imitation in that firms may try to copy both routines
and technologies they deem better. Economic evolutionary dynamics does, how-
ever, also work through growth and expansion of successful firms. Ulrich Witt
(2005) points out that this entails many differences to genetic evolution, espe-
cially that firms are able to access and modify their routines or technologies and
that firm expansion itself leads to issues routed in the interaction with the un-
derlying human evolution - anthropological properties of interaction in groups
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of different sizes (Witt (2005), Cordes et al. (2011)). It is quite possible, that
a firm’s success and growth will lead to destructive internal developments - an
issue not found in biological evolution. An extensive discussion also unfolded
around the question whether evolutionary economics is Darwinian or Lamarck-
ian, whether conscious decisions enter the domain of evolutionary information
(see Hodgson (2001)). But no matter which one it is, the question of sufficient
resilience on the one hand and retention of information, retention of traits, on
the other, remains.
Points 1 and 2 above (missing or excessive selection pressure) are relatively
changeable properties of the environment that may affect but are not directly
comprised in the evolutionary adaptation mechanisms of competing entities.
For very rigid systems (point 3), there are abundant examples from economic
history. Joel Mokyr (1990) makes a compelling case that central organization
without tolerance for pluralism led to China’s stunning lack of progress and the
loss of its technological and economic lead during the European early modern
age. The same may, however also hold for modern countries - consider the Soviet
government’s ill-fated support for Trofim Lysenko’s unfounded theories (Soyfer
(2001)) - and business enterprises - consider that small firms are known to be
more innovative than large ones (Nooteboom (1994)).
The most interesting case may, however, be that of excessive diversity gen-
eration, failure to retain information, and error catastrophe. Economic entities,
lacking many of the stability inducing mechanisms present in biological evolu-
tion, may be particularly vulnerable to that. In many economic systems, the
population size - the number of firms, for instance - is due to network effects
and other causes in many cases extremely small. Examples include all typical
oligopolistic sectors from resource extraction to manufacturing to information
technology. Consequently, the failure of one firm - even accidental without
structural reasons - would lead to the loss of a considerable knowledge base.
The same may be true for decisions not to deploy resources in training of new
skilled laborers or development of human capital (a task that often falls to the
governments). However, even large populations can undergo error catastrophe if
the mutation rate is sufficiently large. What if this occurs in an economic sector
with large numbers of small firms (such as craft businesses, retail businesses,
and other firms with strong local focus)? In ecological terms, that sector would
shrink, lose the some of its deep knowledge, and would make way for other
sectors, perhaps more modern technologies. Would that, in a world continuous
technological change, be clear in retrospect? It is unlikely, but the idea is con-
ceivable. Two questions would in that regard be of importance: What would
trigger the transition to error catastrophe (the maximum sustainable mutation
rate)? And where is the threshold? From evolutionary biology, it is clear that
error catastrophe the threshold declines in the genome length and rises in the
number of individuals. Typically, intensifying technological change would in-
crease the economic equivalent to the mutation rate, particularly in traditional
sectors. It could, ceteris paribus, with constant population and knowledge base,
put the firm population into error catastrophe. Different from biological pop-
ulations (which would then be destroyed), economic systems would probably
be resilient enough to respond with a smaller ”genome length”, i.e. less deep
knowledge.3 The threshold could even be estimated. Note that it is conceiv-
3Note that a larger population size would mathematically also work but would not be
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able that, akin to RNA viruses, some economic systems exist close to the error
threshold to achieve maximum resilience - which is of critical importance in
quickly changing environments.
As a potential recent example, consider the development of bookselling since
the advent of information technology and the internet. In many countries4,
most small bookshops have been forced out of business and replaced by large
retail chains or online bookstores. However, even before the rise of Amazon,
they faced difficulties competing with new information sources (the internet),
something that might currently also be happening to newspaper journalism. The
independent bookshops that remain tend to be specialized, catering to certain
communities, sometimes with a second business as antiquarian shops and often
still at risk of going out of business.
5 Conclusion: The Last Bookshop in the Infor-
mation Age
Is the decline of bookselling a case of error catastrophe or just the natural course
of Schumpeterian creative destruction? The question of whether to preserve the
tacit knowledge of dying sectors is also an ethical one. If technological and
structural changes require an adjustment, some of the knowledge in question
might soon be functionally obsolete anyway, but much of it - as every book
salesperson will confirm - might actually still be useful even in the information
age. It is as yet unclear if books will be transformed into decorative commodities,
if a limited demand for actual books will persist, and even if the medium will
survive as e-book. It is also unclear if, to what extent, and by which trade the
tasks of book salespeople will be performed in the future. What is clear is that
a considerable part of the diversity is about to be lost - as has happened to
other trades before.
Whether of not the phenomenon can - as I would like to argue - be de-
scribed as an evolutionary error catastrophe, if retention of a part of the di-
versity was desirable, the task would likely fall to the public. Protecting small
businesses, enhancing cooperation between them, and facilitating the perpetu-
ation of knowledge in their trades (professional education) could serve to add
stability, lower random variation and delay error catastrophe mechanisms; the
active development of interconnections with new technologies and emerging sec-
tors might even transfer a part of the knowledge base into a new, less hostile,
environment.
Whether or not the decline of economic sectors can be described as error
catastrophe, the possibility of such a phenomenon of successive and catastrophic
loss of information in economic systems is present - no matter how such systems
are constructed. The present article gave an overview over existing knowledge of
importance to this, discussed potential phenomena, and attempted to identify
examples.
Many questions remain for future research: Where would the threshold for
error catastrophe be in economic evolutionary systems? Could it take the same
feasible for a shrinking sector.
4Some countries implemented regulations preventing the use of some competition tech-
niques favoring large firms (retail price wars).
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catastrophic form as in biological systems or would the system respond by ad-
justing the size of the evolutionary information downward - creating a less spe-
cialized business? Is the importance of resilience in economic systems high
enough to facilitate the emergence of evolutionary entities that exist close to
the error catastrophe threshold (as with RNA viruses)?
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A Threshold to Error Catastrophe Following
Eigen et al. (1988)
Consider a set of m information sequences (gene sequences in biological systems)
of length v, with population sizes x0, x1, ..., xm−1 and reproductive fitnesses
a0, a1, ..., am−1. Let the share of mutations from sequence i to sequence j be
denoted Qij (Qii denotes the share of identical replicants) and let there be a
m ×m matrix W with elements Wij = aiQij .5 The dynamic development of
the system is given by
∇x
dt
= Wx.
Call matrixW ’s the eigenvalues-eigenvector pairs (λw, w). By definition (λww =
Ww) it follows that the set of eigenvalues w with λw 6= 0 are exactly the vectors
multiplying which to the matrix W yield a scaled version (with factor λw) of
the vector itself, i.e. the set of states x for which the proportions between
the components (x0, x1, ..., xm−1) remain dynamically constant. These states
(as far as they are valid, i.e. do not contain negative elements) are termed
the quasispecies of the evolutionary system. Since their dynamic development
is governed by factor λw, the population converges towards the quasispecies
corresponding to the dominant (largest) eigenvalue.
Call x0 the master sequence (unmutated form) and combine all sequences
k 6= 0 into one set of variables and equations. The system simplifies to( dx0
dt
dxk 6=0
dt
)
=
(
a0Q00 ak 6=0Qk0
a0(1−Q00) ak 6=0Qkk
)(
x0
xk 6=0
)
.
5The matrix may be extended to include a degradation term Dij (only populated in the
main diagonal, otherwise 0) that accounty for the death of individuals representing sequence
i, hence Wij = aiQij −Dij.
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where ak 6=0 denotes the average mutant reproductive fitness. Assume that back
mutations from mutant sequences back to the master sequence are extremely
unlikely, with the probability decreasing quickly for smaller populations, and ne-
glect consequently the upper element of the new transormation matrix, ak 6=0Qk0.
Thus, ( dx0
dt
dxk 6=0
dt
)
=
(
a0Q00 0
a0(1−Q00) ak 6=0Qkk
)(
x0
xk 6=0
)
.
This, in turn can be expressed in terms of shares by setting x as the vector
of shares instead of absolute population sizes and caring for renormalization to∑m−1
i=0 xi = x0 + xk 6=0 = 1 by subtracting the mean excess reproduction in the
development equation
∇x
dt
= Wx− φx
where φ =
∑m−1
i=0 xiai = x0a0 + xk 6=0ak 6=0 = x0a0 + (1− x0)ak 6=0 is the averag-
efitness. Hence, in the reduced system
dx0
dt
= a0Q00x0 − φx0 = x0(a0Q00x0 − x0a0 − (1− x0)ak 6=0)
dxk 6=0
dt
= a0(1−Q00)x0 + ak 6=0Qkk(1− x0)− φx0
As the two shares sum up to 1, the system can be completely represented by the
first equation, the population share of the master sequence. The equilibrium
set results (with dx0dt = 0) as
x0,1 = 0
x0,2 =
a0Q00 − ak 6=0
a0 + ak 6=0
with the stability determined6 by the eigenvalue of the linearized Jacobian of
this system, given by the linearization of
λ =
∂dx0/dt
∂x0
= −2x0(a0 + ak 6=0) + (a0Q00 − ak 6=0)
which for the two equilibria takes the values
λ(x0,1 = 0) = a0Q00 − ak 6=0
λ(x0,2 =
a0Q00 − ak 6=0
a0 + ak 6=0
) = −a0Q00 + ak 6=0.
While the first (trivial) equilibrium is the collapse if the master sequence pop-
ulation (error catastrophe), the second defines a stable share for the master
sequence. The system undergoes a phase transition at
0 = a0Q00 − ak 6=0,
the stability condition for the second (non-trivial) equilibrium is
0 < a0Q00 − ak 6=0
6As with all differential equation systems, the fixed point is stable if and only if the (dom-
inant) eigenvalue is negative.
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a0Q00 > ak 6=0
Q00 >
ak 6=0
a0
=
1
σ0
where σ0 =
a0
ak 6=0
stands for the relative superiority of the fitness of the master
sequence.
Until now, Q00 denotes the probability of retention of the entire master
sequence, i.e. including all v loci of the sequence. This could also be evaluated
position-wise, yielding (if mutations in all positions are uniformly likely)
Q00 = (q00)
v >
1
σ0
q00 >
v
√
1
σ0
v log q00 > − log σ0
v < − log σ0
log q00
≈ log σ0
1− q00 .
It can be seen that the survival of the master sequence, in other words the
prevention of error catastrophe depends on (1) the population size (the larger
the better), (2) the amount of information (genome length in biological systems;
the smaller the better), and (3) the mutation/change probability (the smaller
the better). As argued above, for social or economic evolutonary systems, the
population size tends to be much smaller than for, say a colony of bacteria. With
many stabilizing mechanisms in the reproduction mechanism not in place, the
mutation rate should equally be higher. The size of the involved information set
(which is for typical economic systems not fully codified) is difficult to estimate
but perhaps smaller than genome sizes in biology (of the order of thousands or
tens of thousands for simple entities such as viruses), hence perhaps working in
favor or preventing error catastrophe.
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